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ABSTRACT
A classic property rights question looms large in the field
of patent law: where do the rights of inventors end and the
rights of the public begin? The right of inventors to modify
the scope of their claimed inventions, even after the patent
issues, is in direct tension with the concepts of public notice
and the public domain. The Patent Act currently permits
broadening of claims so long as a reissue application
demonstrating intent to broaden is filed within two years of
the original patent issue. Over the years, however, this
relatively straightforward statutory provision has sparked
numerous disputes over its meaning and application.
On September 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit heard oral arguments for In re Staats. In this
case, Apple Computer, Inc. appeals the rejection of a
continuation reissue patent application. The U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office and the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences rejected the application on the grounds that
Apple attempted to broaden the scope of its patent claims in a
manner not “foreseeable” more than eight years after the
patent first issued. Apple contends that the language of the
statute and prior case law permit its interpretation, and the
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application should be allowed in the interest of innovation.
This issue is hardly a new one—this submission highlights
nearly 140 years of case law, legislative history, and statutory
shaping pertaining to broadening reissues. We analyze the
issues raised in the briefs from Staats, as well as the oral
arguments. Finally, we discuss from a practitioner’s
perspective what the Federal Circuit could do—and should
do—in the field of broadening reissues.
INTRODUCTION
From its grounding in the U.S. Constitution2 to its
staggeringly complex application in modern society and business,
intellectual property—and in particular, patent law—has always
required a reasonable balance between adequate public notice and
providing enforceable rights. One question looms large in the field of
patent law: where do the rights of inventors end and the rights of the
public begin? Analyzing this question poses significant difficulties,
even after the grant of a patent, as demonstrated by the explosive
growth in post-grant adjudication both at the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office (USPTO) and in the courts.3 Portions of the recent
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act appear to reinforce that the scope
¶1

2

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”)
3
The year 2010 saw more grants of reissue patents and more applications for
inter partes and ex parte reexamination than in any prior year. See UNITED
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR
YEARS 1963–2010 (Mar. 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (The USPTO
granted 847 reissue patents in 2010, a record number more than 46% higher than
the previous record year); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (June 30, 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report_June_2011.pdf (2010 saw a
record 780 applications for ex parte reexamination, more than 20% more than in
2009); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (June 30, 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/IP_quarterly_report_June_2011.pdf (The number
of inter partes reexamination applications has increased every year since the
inception of the proceeding in 1999).
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of property rights accorded by the “limited monopoly” of a patent
may shift during the life of the patent.4
One of the most straightforward ways patent owners can
expand the limited monopoly of a patent is by seeking increased
claim scope via one or more broadening reissue patent applications.
While patent owners may narrow the scope of patent claims at any
time during the life of the patent, they may only broaden claim scope
for a limited period of time after issuance of the patent.5 Despite this
relatively straightforward statutory provision in 35 U.S.C. § 251,
however, an expansive body of case law has construed the provision,
dating back well over a century.6 The statute clearly requires notice
of the intent to broaden, and current jurisprudence specifies that
manifestation of such intent should have been “foreseeable” within
two years from the issue date of the patent.7 Under what
circumstances, if any, should a patent owner be allowed to broaden
claim scope beyond the statutory window of two years after issuance
of the patent?
¶2

4

See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 6, chs.
31–32 (signed into law by President Obama on Sept. 16, 2011) (addressing postgrant review procedures).
5
See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 1412.03 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) (discussing
implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (“No reissue patent shall be granted
enlarging the scope of the original patent unless applied for within two years
from the grant of the original patent.”)).
6
Although 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) has only been codified in its current form for
fifty-nine years (see Patent Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat.
792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–318 (2006)), the concept of patent
reissue dates back much further. See, e.g., Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350
(1881); see also Part I, infra.
7
See Ex parte Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Apr.
26, 2010) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and footnotes omitted):
Simply put, the broadening in the present reissue application is in a
manner that was completely unforeseeable by the public within the twoyear period following the original patent’s issuance—a fact likewise
admitted at the oral hearing. Despite Appellants’ arguments to the
contrary, permitting such an unforeseeable broadening nearly eight
years after Appellants’ original patent issued simply runs counter to the
underlying public notice function of § 251—notice that must be timely to
ensure meaningful reliance on the finality and certainty of patent rights.
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Patent applications are notoriously complicated legal
documents, difficult to draft in a manner that accurately captures the
full scope of the invention without unnecessary limitations. All too
often, the task of drafting their disclosures is in inexperienced hands.
The current patent system provides little incentive for patentees or the
USPTO to spend sufficient time and money to prosecute a highquality patent;8 the result is a kudzu-like thicket of low-quality,
under-descriptive patents.9 Almost 120 years ago in Topliff v. Topliff,
the Supreme Court demonstrated remarkable foresight about today’s
reissue dilemma.
¶3

To hold that a patent can never be reissued for an enlarged claim
would be not only to override the obvious intent of the statute, but
would operate in many cases with great hardship upon the patentee.
The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention
be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal
instruments to draw with accuracy, and in view of the fact that
valuable inventions are often placed in the hands of inexperienced
persons to prepare such specifications and claims, it is no matter of
surprise that the latter frequently fail to describe with requisite
certainty the exact invention of the patentee, and err either in claiming
that which the patentee had not in fact invented, or in omitting some
element which was a valuable or essential part of his actual invention.
Under such circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust to deny him
the benefit of a reissue to secure to him his actual invention, provided
it is evident that there has been a mistake and he has been guilty of no
want of reasonable diligence in discovering it . . . .”10

8

See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (weighing incentives of patentees and the USPTO,
and finding that both parties benefit from the filing of a higher volume of patent
applications that are of lower quality: “In short, the PTO doesn’t do a very
detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don’t want it to. It is
‘rationally ignorant’ of the objective validity of patents, in economics lingo,
because it is too costly for the PTO to discover those facts.” Id. at 1497 (internal
footnote omitted)).
9
See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 577, 577, 579, 588–91 (1999) (arguing that the increased volume of
patent applications, particularly as patentable subject matter has expanded in the
courts, has “pushed the patent system into crisis.”).
10
Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892); see also P. J. Federico,
Intervening Rights in Patent Reissues, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 614–15
(1961–1962) (citing Topliff in the context of intervening rights provisions).
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Reading Topliff over a century later, it appears that some things never
change.11
Where reissue applications likely serve a valuable function in
the patent system, how can we separate the wheat from the chaff so
that patent owners may broaden claim scope after the statutory
window of two years after issuance has closed, while still protecting
the public’s right to rely on the scope of the patent as originally
issued? Recently, this question has again come under scrutiny in the
courts. In 2010, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(Board) denied Apple Computer, Inc. the right to broaden the claims
of five of its patents on the grounds that it had failed to provide
proper notice within the two-year statutory window.12 Apple
appealed one of the cases, In re Staats, to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC), and oral arguments were heard on
September 8, 2011.13 The decision of the CAFC panel has the
potential to become the most definitive statement in broadening
reissue practice in almost twenty years, and will likely coincide with
sweeping changes recently signed into law in the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act.14
¶4

Part I of this article will review pertinent case law in the realm
of reissue patent practice. Part II will analyze the facts of the Staats
case currently before the CAFC. Part III will critically review the
¶5

11

See, e.g., 59 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1257–62 (1892) (summarizing Topliff and
noting that claims could be broadened “provided it is evident that there has been
a mistake and that the applicant has been guilty of no want of reasonable
diligence in discovering it,” that there was a presumption that after two years
from issuance anything not claimed had been “abandoned,” and further
discussing the idea of undue delay and laches, all of which are at issue in
Staats); see Part II, infra.
12
Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 26, 2010); In re
Kelly, No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 26, 2010); Ex parte
Riddle, No. 2011-002276, 2011 WL 486246 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 10, 2011); Ex parte
Riddle, No. 2011-002277, 2011 WL 486252 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 11, 2011); Ex parte
Riddle, No. 2011-001749, 2011 WL 861732 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 10, 2011).
13
Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 26, 2010), appeal
docketed, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2010), argued, Oral
Argument, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/search/audio.html
(search for “2010-1443” in the field “Appeal Number”).
14
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 6, chs. 31–32
(signed into law by President Obama on Sept. 16, 2011) (addressing post-grant
review procedures).
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arguments presented by the parties in Staats to the CAFC, as well as
larger public-policy themes relevant to resolution of the arguments.
Finally, Part IV will offer concluding remarks, and explore the
possible paths that the CAFC may take to reform broadening reissue
patent practice.
I. REISSUE JURISPRUDENCE
“These provisions [concerning patent reissue practice] have often
been before the courts and there are sharply differing views
concerning them.”15

The concept of patent reissue in the United States dates back
nearly as far as the concept of the patent itself. A reissue provision
first appeared in the Patent Act of 1832,16 which Congress passed on
July 3, 1832, largely in response to the Supreme Court case Grant v.
Raymond,17 decided in January of the same year. The relevant
provision of the Patent Act of 1832 read
¶6

[t]hat wherever any patent which has been heretofore, or shall be
hereafter, granted to any inventor in pursuance of [the Patent Act of
1793], or of any of the acts supplementary thereto, shall be invalid or
inoperative, by reason that any of the terms or conditions prescribed in
the third section of the said first mentioned act, have not, by
inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or
deceptive intention, been complied with on the part of the said
inventor, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State, upon the
surrender to him of such patent, to cause a new patent to be granted to
the said inventor for the same invention for the residue of the period
then unexpired, for which the original patent was granted, upon his
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed in the said third
section of the said act.18

The general stipulations of this provision survive today,19 with minor
changes in language and the formal codified addition of the two-year
statutory period upon the passage of the Patent Act of 1952.20
15

Sontag Chain Stores Co., Ltd. v. Nat’l Nut Co. of Cal., 310 U.S. 281, 284
(1940).
16
An Act Concerning Patents for Useful Inventions, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832).
17
31 U.S. 218 (1832).
18
An Act Concerning Patents for Useful Inventions, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832).
19
Compare with 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006):
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention,
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective
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By the mid-nineteenth century, patentees were using—and
abusing—the reissue statutes in the rapidly industrializing United
States. Abuse of reissue statutes led to the landmark decision in
Miller v. Brass Co.,21 where the Supreme Court stated the problem as
follows:
¶7

[B]y a curious misapplication of the law [the reissue provision] has
come to be principally resorted to for the purpose of enlarging and
expanding patent claims. And the evils which have grown from the
practice have assumed large proportions. Patents have been so
expanded and idealized, years after their first issue, that hundreds and
thousands of mechanics and manufactures, who had just reason to
suppose that the field of action was open, have been obliged to
discontinue their employments, or to pay an enormous tax for
continuing them.22

The Supreme Court reiterated that reissue was only available in the
case of a mistake, and for the first time set the two-year deadline for
broadening reissue.23 This two-year window was consistently
recognized by courts from that point forward, and it was formally
written into the Patent Act upon its retooling in 1952.24 Miller v.

specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or
less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the
surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee required by law,
reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in
accordance with a new and amended application, for the unexpired part of
the term of the original patent. No new matter shall be introduced into the
application for reissue.
20

Patent Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–318 (2006) (“No reissued patent shall be granted
enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within
two years from the grant of the original patent.”). As discussed infra, this
statute was merely the codification of a common law rule that had been in use
for decades.
21
104 U.S. 350 (1881).
22
Id. at 355.
23
Id. at 352 (“If two years’ public enjoyment of an invention with the consent
and allowance of the inventor is evidence of abandonment, and a bar to an
application for a patent, a public disclaimer in the patent itself should be
construed equally favorable to the public.”).
24
See LADAS & PERRY, LLP, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PATENT LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES n.37, http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory_fn.html
(last updated July 17, 2009) (“When the code was established prior laws had
been compiled into it but nor [sic] re-enacted. Subsequently it was felt desirable
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Brass Co. (also known as Bridgeport Brass) has been cited thirtyseven times by the Supreme Court since 1882 and remains good law
today. An example of the consistent application of the two-year
window can be seen in In re Otto, a 1919 decision from the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia.25 The court noted: “We must
now regard the law as well settled by the Supreme Court of the
United States that, after the lapse of two years after the issue of a
patent, a reissue which seeks to enlarge the claims of the original
patent will not be granted.”26 The court went on to state that
exceptions were possible, but diligence would certainly be required.27
Other alterations and expansions of the reissue privilege have
been comparatively recent.28 An important decision came from the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the 1970 case In re Doll.29
The USPTO issued the patent in question with nineteen claims on
December 20, 1955. A reissue application containing twelve
additional, broadened claims for the purpose of provoking an
interference was properly filed on October 31, 1957—one year and
ten months after the initial issue.30 But during further ex parte
proceedings and a second interference, the patentees added and
amended additional claims as late as October 16, 1962, nearly seven
years after issue.31 The USPTO rejected the claims that were added
outside the two-year period, stating they were time-barred by 35
U.S.C. § 251, and the rejection was upheld by the Patent Office
Board of Appeals.32 The patentee appealed, arguing that the plain
¶8

to clean up and re-enact each title of the code as positive law. In 1952 it was
patents [sic] turn.”).
25
259 F. 985 (D.C. Cir. 1919).
26
Id. at 986 (quoting In re Starkey, 21 App. D.C. 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1903)).
27
Id.
28
This article chiefly focuses on the major cases of the last forty years. For a
detailed summary of the evolution of reissue jurisprudence prior to the 1970s,
see Federico, supra note 10, at 605–24.
29
419 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The CCPA was the direct predecessor court of
the CAFC. The CAFC was created in 1982. See History of the Court, THE FED.
CIRCUIT HISTORICAL SOC’Y,
http://www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/historyofcourt.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2011).
30
In re Doll, 419 F.2d at 926.
31
Id.
32
Id. The Patent Office Board of Appeals was the predecessor tribunal at the
USPTO to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Under the LeahySmith America Invents Act, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences will
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language of the statute “unless applied for within two years from the
grant of the original patent”33 meant exactly that: the application for
reissue patent merely needed to be applied for within the two years,
with the right to tinker thereafter with its scope preserved.34 The
court looked to the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, and in
vacating the Board of Appeals’ decision, was “unable to ascertain . . .
any intent similar to the interpretation placed on section 251 by the
board. To the contrary, it appears clear that the language ‘applied
for’ refers to filing of an application.”35 The government argued that
the “rights of the public” demanded the rejection of the expanded
claims, but the court disagreed, stating that it was unnecessary to
even reach the issue due to the plain-meaning interpretation of section
251.36 The court did note, however, that “35 U.S.C. 252 provides
safeguards for the public by virtue of its intervening rights
provisions.”37
Later decisions have further defined the softer contours of the
blunt two-year restriction. In In re Fotland,38 the CAFC affirmed the
rejection of broadened claims introduced outside the two-year
window when an application had been filed within two years.39 The
reissue application in question, however, was a so-called “no defect”
reissue application filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4).40 During
¶9

be replaced by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board effective September 16, 2012.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 3(j) (signed
into law by President Obama on Sept. 16, 2011) (renaming tribunal due to
elimination of interference proceedings).
33
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1966).
34
Doll, 419 F.2d at 926–27.
35
Id. at 928.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
779 F.2d 31 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
39
Id. at 32.
40
Id. 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) was repealed in 1982 as it was deemed to be
redundant to the then-newly instituted ex parte reexamination process. See id. at
32 n.1 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 21746, 21748–49, 21752 (May 19, 1982)). The
provision in effect at the time of the events of Fotland read as follows:
(4) When the applicant is aware of prior art or other information relevant
to patentability, not previously considered by the Office, which might
cause the examiner to deem the original patent wholly or partly
inoperative or invalid, particularly specifying such prior art or other
information and requesting that if the examiner so deems, the applicant be
permitted to amend the patent and be granted a reissue patent.
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prosecution of the reissue application, the examiner deemed that there
was no impact on the patent by the new references and rejected the
application for reissue.41 The reissue applicants responded, then two
years and three months after issue, by amending the claims and
attempting to convert the reissue application to one under a different
regulation that would have allowed broadening.42 The USPTO and
the Board rejected the reissue claim amendments as being made
outside the permissible two-year window. The applicants appealed to
the CAFC, urging that a reissue application had been filed within two
years of patent grant.43 The CAFC affirmed, however, stating that
Doll authorized later broadening only when a broadening reissue was
filed within two years; a “no defect” reissue was not within the
purview of the plain language of the statute.44
Two cases in the next decade affirmed both Fotland and Doll,
and provided more detail with regard to when broadening reissue
applications were permissible. First, a Board decision in Buell v.
Beckestrom held that divisional reissue applications that broadened
claims outside the two-year window were permissible under 35
U.S.C. § 251, so long as an intervening reissue that demonstrated
intent to broaden was filed within the two-year period.45 Second, the
CAFC later affirmed in In re Graff that both divisional and
continuation reissues could include broadened claims more than two
years after issuance, if, as in Buell, patentees filed a proper
parent-broadening reissue application within two years of patent
grant.46 The particular reissue application in Graff, however, was
held insufficient because the parent reissue application only sought to
correct an error in a figure, not to broaden the claims.47 The Graff
court particularly focused on public notice:
¶10

37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1980). The provision essentially allowed a patent
holder who found new prior art relevant to the invention post-issue to bring it to
the USPTO and obtain re-review of the claims without amending the claims or
the specification. See Robert W. Fieseler, Note, Staying Litigation Pending
Reexamination of Patents, 14 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 279, 285 (1983).
41
Fotland, 779 F.2d at 32–33.
42
Id. at 33.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 34.
45
22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1128, 1130 (B.P.A.I. 1992).
46
111 F.3d 874, 876–77 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
47
Id. at 877 (citing Fotland).
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The reissue statute balances the purpose of providing the patentee with
an opportunity to correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the
public interest in finality and certainty of patent rights . . . . The
interested public is entitled to rely on the absence of a broadening
reissue application within two years of grant of the original patent.48

In summary, if and only if a patentee properly files a
broadening reissue application, based on an “error” within two years
of patent issuance, would further broadening be possible for
later-filed reissue applications claiming priority from an original
(parent) reissue application. It is critical to note that an “error” under
§ 251 has also developed a standard definition in the case law—
surrendering claims during prosecution of the application which led
to an issued patent in order to gain allowance of other claims is not an
“error” that justifies a reissue.49 An attempt to pursue previously
surrendered claims via reissue is known as “recapture,” which is
generally not permitted to any real extent, is described in the MPEP,
and was most recently discussed by the CAFC in In re
Mostafazadeh.50 There were few other ripples in the pool of reissue
jurisprudence until the landmark year of 2010.
¶11

II. MULTIPLE BITES FROM “THE APPLE”—KELLY, RIDDLE,
AND STAATS
A new dimension has evolved in the doctrine of broadening
reissue over the last two years, begging a new question: what if a
patentee properly files a broadening reissue application within the
two-year window, but then attempts to broaden again, in a different
manner from the original reissue application, via one or more
continuation reissue applications filed outside the two-year window?
This question arose from five rejected reissue applications directed
towards computer-system architecture from Apple Computer, Inc. in
2010–2011. Ex parte Kelly,51 Ex parte Staats,52 and three different
¶12

48

Id.
Ex parte Pagilagan, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1633 (B.P.A.I. 2002).
50
See MPEP § 1412.02; see also In re Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). The Mostafazadeh court held that a claim could be broadened in a
reissue to incorporate surrendered subject matter if the claim is also materially
narrowed with respect to the surrendered subject matter.
51
No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 26, 2010).
52
No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 26, 2010).
49
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rejected reissue applications in Ex parte Riddle,53 involved
broadening reissue applications filed by Apple and rejected by
various USPTO examiners under 35 U.S.C. § 251 for improper
broadening outside the two-year window.
The facts of each case were essentially identical and were
treated as such by the Board.54 The Board did not dispute that Apple
properly filed a broadening reissue application within the two-year
statutory period, or that proper continuation reissue applications were
later filed.55 In all cases, Apple acknowledged filing all of the
relevant rejected reissue applications (in some cases, as in Staats, the
second or third continuation reissue claiming priority to the original,
“qualifying” reissue application)56 “to broaden the claims in different
ways.”57 The examiners in each case rejected the claims as
impermissible attempts to broaden because the entirely different
manner of broadening proposed in the latest reissue applications
would deny the public sufficient notice.58 Apple appealed each case
and argued that while “an intent to broaden” must certainly be shown
within the two-year period—and in each case, was shown—the
“eventual scope” of the initial broadening need not be fully laid out in
that first reissue application filing inside the two-year period.59
Because the public was duly notified of “any intent” to broaden
within two years of patent issuance, earlier case law such as Doll
¶13

53

Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-002276, 2011 WL 486246 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 10,
2011); Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-002277, 2011 WL 486252 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 11,
2011); Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-001749, 2011 WL 861732 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 10,
2011).
54
See, e.g., Kelly, No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272, at *1 (“Since the
present application pertains to substantially the same issue of law as in Staats,
the reasoning in Staats applies largely to the issue before us in this appeal.”).
55
See, e.g., Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *2 (“The Examiner
found that the present reissue application impermissibly broadens the patented
claims beyond two years from the original patent’s issuance. The Examiner
assumed that the present application is a proper continuation application . . .
[and] that Appellants indicated an intent to broaden the patented claims within
two years.”) (citations omitted).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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should permit any broadening in a later—and properly filed—
continuation or divisional reissue application.60
Thus, Apple appealed a fairly concrete issue to the Board:
“whether a continuing reissue application can broaden patented
claims beyond the two-year statutory period in a manner unrelated to
the broadening aspect that was identified within the two-year
period.”61 As the Board admitted, “[t]his is a case of first
impression.”62 The Board first looked to the statute and the case law,
and noted the holding of Graff in particular, which neatly presented
the issue of adequate public notice by stating that the “public is
entitled to rely on the absence of a broadening reissue application
within two years of grant of the original patent.”63 Here, though,
there was a relevant broadening reissue within two years—it was just
intended to broaden a different aspect of the patent claims than that
addressed in the rejected second reissue application. Apple’s patent
at issue in Staats64 contained claims directed to two embodiments.65
The original reissue application, properly filed on the two-year
anniversary of issue, sought to broaden claims directed to one
embodiment. The claims in the rejected continuation reissue
application, filed some six years later, sought to broaden claims
directed to the other embodiment.66 Apple was forthcoming about
this fact, conceding it “absolutely” during oral argument before the
Board.67
¶14

In the end, the Board affirmed the USPTO and rejected all of
the broadened claims in the continuation reissue applications.68
¶15

60

See id. (“According to Appellants, so long as the public is notified
of any intent to broaden within two years, it is unnecessary to notify the public
of the specific scope of broadening within that time period.”) (emphasis in
original).
61
Id. at *3.
62
Id. at *7.
63
Id. (quoting In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
64
U.S. Patent No. 5,940,600 (filed Apr. 1, 1996) (issued Aug. 17, 1999).
65
Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *7–8.
66
Id. at *8.
67
See id. at *8 nn.10–11. When asked by Administrative Patent Judge Jeffery
whether the original broadening declaration was to a different embodiment than
the present application and whether “no one could have foreseen” the second
broadening based on the original declaration, Apple’s counsel responded
“Absolutely” to both questions.
68
See, e.g., id. at *15 (“For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not
persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12–32 under 35
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Stating that such unforeseeable broadening would “run[] counter to
the public notice function underpinning § 251,” the Board refused to
allow the continuing reissue application in Staats because “[t]o hold
otherwise would effectively give Appellants a license to
unforeseeably shift from one invention to another via reissue well
beyond the two-year statutory period.”69 The Board soundly rejected
Apple’s assertions that Doll, Graff, and even the MPEP permitted
their actions.70 The Board distinguished Doll and Graff because the
broadening in those cases was directed toward the same embodiment,
whereas, in the present case, multiple embodiments were at issue.71
Apple’s MPEP-based arguments are worth noting. Apple
cited MPEP § 1412.03(IV) in its brief: “Where any intent to broaden
is indicated in the reissue application within the two years from the
patent grant, a broadened claim can subsequently be presented in the
reissue after the two year period.”72 On appeal, the Board conceded
that this passage of the MPEP seemed to indicate via “ambiguous
expansive” language that the second broadening might be
allowable.73 But the Board noted that the July 2008 revision to the
MPEP made an important change to this provision—it inserted the
word “unequivocally” between “is” and “indicated.”74 The provision
now reads “[w]here any intent to broaden is unequivocally indicated
in the reissue application within the two years from the patent grant, a
broadened claim can subsequently be presented in the reissue after
the two year period.”75 One is left to wonder, however, whether
Apple reasonably could have anticipated this new qualifying
provision in the language of the MPEP. Curiously, Apple did not
challenge this discrepancy, neither in its briefs nor at oral argument at
any level of the appeals.
¶16

The Board finally rejected Apple’s claims in Staats in
November 2007—almost eight months before the July 2008 MPEP
¶17

U.S.C. § 251. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those
claims.”)
69
Id. at *9.
70
See id. at *9–13.
71
Id. at *10.
72
Id. at *11 & n.20.
73
Id. at *11.
74
Id. (citing MPEP § 1412.03 (8th ed. Rev. 7, July 2008)).
75
Id.
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revision came into effect.76 Moreover, the claim rejections in Kelly
also occurred before the MPEP revision;77 and the rejections in
Riddle would have taken place after the revision.78 Nevertheless, the
Board believed that the public-notice function of 35 U.S.C. § 251
trumped the MPEP taken alone.79
The Board decided the Kelly and Riddle cases after Staats,
applying virtually identical reasoning given the virtually identical
facts of the interrelated appeals. Apple appealed the Staats decision
to the Federal Circuit on June 24, 2010, soon after the release of the
Board opinion on April 26, 2010.80 The parties completed briefing in
April 2011,81 and the CAFC heard oral arguments on September 8,
2011.82
¶18

III. STAATS—“OVERLY BROAD”?
The Staats case presents a collision between two robust
statutory interpretations and two equally weighty sets of policy
considerations. On the one hand, the public-notice function cited by
both the USPTO and the Board, and regarded as a hallmark of the
¶19

76

Id. at *6.
In re Kelly, No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272, at *6 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 26,
2010) (final rejection mailed Nov. 2007).
78
See, e.g., Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-002276, 2011 WL 486246, at *7
(B.P.A.I. Feb. 10, 2011) (final rejection mailed Dec. 2009).
79
Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *11 (“But even assuming,
without deciding, that this is the case, we still are unconvinced that the law
permits broadening in a completely unforeseeable manner after two years as
Appellants have done here, particularly when considering the MPEP together
with the reissue statute and its crucial public notice function.” (emphasis in
original)).
80
Petition for Review, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2010)
(accessed on the USTPO Public PAIR system at
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair under application number
11/503,541).
81
See Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
16, 2010), 2010 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 1111; Brief of AppelleeRespondent, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2011), 2011 U.S.
Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 327; Reply Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats,
No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 403.
82
Oral Argument, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argumentrecordings/search/audio.html (search for “2010-1443” in the field “Appeal
Number”).
77
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protections in 35 U.S.C. § 251, is crucial.83 The public has the right
to know what is claimed and disclaimed in a patent, and patentees
should not be able to reshape their inventions throughout the life of
the patent simply by lodging a “placeholder” broadening reissue
application within two years of patent issuance, from which any
number of potentially disparate continuing reissue applications could
be filed. Allowing such activity without adequate safeguards could
result in a scenario in which a competitor could spend millions,
perhaps billions, of dollars based on knowledge of the bounds of the
limited monopoly granted by a particular patent, only to face an
infringement action years later after the boundaries of the limited
monopoly have shifted.
Abuse of reissue practice, particularly in the context of
continuation reissue applications, is nothing new. Testimony before
Congress in 1878 during consideration of Patent Act amendments
reflected the serious concern of members of Congress and members
of the patent bar regarding the potential for misconduct: “Scratch a
reissue and you will find a fraud. In nine cases out of ten you will
find a fraud upon the law, and in every instance a fraud in fact.”84
These doomsday visions are akin to the parade of horribles frequently
presented in arguments against “submarine”-type patents, so called
because they surface after years submerged in prosecution pendency
to “torpedo” mature industries and collect rents.85 The chilling effect
¶20

83

See generally Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent
Prosecution, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179, 180 (2007) (noting that, at the
expense of the public, neither patent applicants nor patent examiners have
incentives in the present iteration of the U.S. patent prosecution system to create
certain, definite claims); see also Gary C. Ganzi, Note, Patent Continuation
Practice and Public Notice: Can They Coexist?, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 545, 592 (2007) (describing the tension between continuation practice
and public notice, the major problem of abuse, and the undesirable ripple effects
of potential solutions); see also J. Christopher Carraway, The Uncertain Future
of Enforcing Patents that Have Been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED. CIR.
B. J. 63, 70–75 (1998) (outlining the policy conflict between permitting
broadening reissue for correction of errors in patent prosecution versus the need
for public notice).
84
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS OF THE S. AND H.R., S. MISC.
DOC. NO. 45-50, at 362 (2d Sess. 1878) (statement of George Payson, Gen.
Counsel, Western R.R. Ass’n); see also Federico, supra note 10, at 610.
85
See generally, Timothy R. DeWitt, Does Supreme Court Precedent Sink
Submarine Patents?, 38 IDEA 601 (1998) (citing Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S.
350 (1881)) (outlining the dangers presented by patents that enlarge their scope
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that such a similar system of ever-shifting scope through reissue
applications would have on innovation is indisputable. With the
possibility of ramping up R&D only to shut it down at or before
production when a broadening reissue application changes the
landscape, industry actors would experience a stifling effect from
unbridled broadening reissue applications that would disrupt the
market at large.
On the other hand, as argued by Apple in the Staats appeal to
the Board, the CAFC in Doll held that the intervening rights provided
by 35 U.S.C. § 252 are potentially sufficient to counterbalance the
damage to public notice done by broadening reissues.86 That is, there
is a clear quid pro quo—in exchange for a reissued patent, the
patentee must “surrender” the original patent.87 Furthermore, given
the recent transparency in publication and prosecution practice for
pending applications and reissue applications at the USPTO,
applicants already surrender a great deal of secrecy before issuance of
a patent or reissue patent. Any broadening reissue patent would of
course still have to be supported by its specification or other claims,
which could have effectively been part of public knowledge for years
¶21

“many years” after issuance). See also Federico, supra note 10, at 636–637
(discussing in passing the concept of presenting “dominating” claims “sometime
after the application has been filed” in the context of intervening rights, and
calling for further study in the context of reissue patents).
86
See In re Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *9–10; see also In
re Doll, 419 F.2d 925, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006) states
[a] reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or
that person’s successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue,
made, purchased, offered to sell, or used within the United States, or
imported into the United States, anything patented by the reissued patent,
to continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to others to be used,
offered for sale, or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased, offered for
sale, used, or imported unless the making, using, offering for sale, or
selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which
was in the original patent.
87

See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006) (“The surrender of the original patent shall take
effect upon the issue of the reissued patent.”). “Surrender” in this context no
longer means a physical surrender of the letters patent; this requirement was
removed from the patent rules in 2004. See Changes To Support
Implementation of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 21st Century
Strategic Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,482–01 (Sept. 21, 2004) (codified at 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.178 (2010)). The reissue patent automatically replaces the original patent in
terms of property right at the time that the reissue patent is granted.
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before the broadening. Therefore, one can argue that nothing would
serve to hamper a competitor from developing a competing and
noninfringing product with improvements in the years it would
undoubtedly take for the USPTO to wade through applications,
reissues, and continuations of those reissues.88
The CAFC will need to tackle a number of outstanding issues
in their consideration of the Staats appeal. For example, in
considering broadening reissue applications, their publication, and
their effect on competition, the court will need to define what is a
“reasonable” delay for the purposes of bringing broadened reissue
claims to the table. Given the language of the Board decision, the
court must consider what is “foreseeable.” Finally, the court will
need to draw a clear line in the sand with regard to whether a patent
claim’s scope will be facially obvious from the original disclosure, or
if future “tweaks” will be permissible.
¶22

A. Apple’s Opening Brief
The parties’ briefs provided a fascinating preview of the
arguments they brought before the CAFC panel on September 8,
2011. For example, in its opening brief, Apple stated that, forty years
ago, Doll established that as long as a broadening reissue is on file
within the statutory two-year period, claims can be further broadened
after that two-year period.89 As reinforced over the years by Fotland,
Graff, and the MPEP, this initial public notice within two years of
patent issuance should adequately balance the needs of patentees and
the public.90 The public-notice policy rationale was the chief force
behind the Board’s decision—but the CAFC and its predecessor court
had rejected that rationale many times before.91 Apple argued that
Doll and its progeny are still good law, and are binding on the CAFC
and the USPTO.92 Furthermore, the USPTO has retained the “any
¶23

88

But see Ganzi, supra note 83, at 594–95 (arguing that new publication regimes
actually serve to undermine public notice by complicating intervening rights
remedies).
89
Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16,
2010), 2010 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 1111, at *9–11.
90
Id. at *11 (quoting In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (35 U.S.C.
§ 251 “balances the purpose of providing the patentee with an opportunity to
correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the public interest in finality and
certainty.”).
91
Id. at *26–27.
92
Id. at *32–34.
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intent to broaden” language in the MPEP as being sufficient for
decades,93 so a decision against Apple on appeal would overturn that
precedent.94
Another compelling argument in Apple’s opening brief was
that the “embodiment” restriction imposed by the Board constituted
an “extra-statutory limitation,” which the CAFC has consistently
ruled impermissible.95 After documenting a number of cases in
which extra requirements on reissue applicants were rejected,96 Apple
declares that this scenario is anything but “a case of first
impression.”97 According to Apple, the Board’s allusion to
prosecution laches is also misplaced and irrelevant, as six years
should not be deemed an “unreasonable” delay, assuming the
applicant demonstrated unequivocal intent to broaden in a broadening
reissue application filing within two years of patent issuance, and
prosecution of reissue application(s) was diligent during that time.98
¶24

It would thus appear that in order to rule against Apple, the
CAFC would have to expressly overrule Doll and Graff, or abrogate
them substantially. Apple concluded its opening brief by addressing
the public-notice policy concerns: to the extent that such a policy
would be relevant, any panic is overblown. The public has plenty of
notice via other existing mechanisms, such as publication and
transparency of reissue prosecution, and intervening rights potentially
would be available. Inventors’ rights must also be taken into account,
¶25

93

But, practitioners have recently been receiving USPTO rejections on
continuation reissue applications implicitly based on the reasoning in Staats.
Consequently, the “any intent” language appears to be marginalized at the
USPTO at present, pending the decision at the Federal Circuit.
94
Id. at *34–37.
95
Id. at *40–41.
96
Id. at *41–45 (citing Graff, 111 F.3d at 876–77 (precluding multiple reissue
patents was “beyond the strictures” of § 251 because the plain language of the
statute contained no such limit); In re Amos, 953 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(rejecting an “intent to claim” requirement); In re Doyle, 293 F.3d 1355, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the preclusion of linking claims in a broadening
reissue); In re Bauman, 683 F.2d 405, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (rejecting a rule
prohibiting regular utility applications from claiming the benefit of reissue
applications for filing date purposes as being extra-statutory to 35 U.S.C. § 120);
In re Doll, 419 F.2d 925, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (ruling the requirement that each
broadening claim be asserted within the two-year window rather than a
broadening application was extra-statutory)).
97
Id. at *43.
98
Id. at *49.
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and they should not be required up front to show all their cards at
once when so much is at stake.99
From the perspective of owners of intellectual property and
many patent practitioners who represent large corporate clients,
Apple’s argument appears on its face to be quite compelling. As the
USPTO prosecution process has become ever more transparent (and
unfortunately, ever more backlogged), the public has plenty of time to
gain notice of what pending applications intend to claim. Companies
can still pay a fee to hide pending applications from public view by
requesting nonpublication,100 but doing so raises transaction costs and
also sacrifices some rights to the nonpublished invention in overseas
markets.101 The public can readily view the USPTO’s Public PAIR102
database to find detailed and up-to-date information on any pending,
published application. Other user-friendly services such as Google®
Patents103 and IP.com104 also make searching patents and even
creating active alert functions accessible at little or no cost. The
variety in access points for this publicly available information
weakens the Board’s reliance on a public notice policy rationale.
¶26

B. The Government’s Opening Brief
By contrast, the government’s opening brief is heavy with
historical and policy appeals, and understandably reinforces much of
the language of the Board’s decision. The government observed, as
did the Board, that the statutory two-year limit is merely the
codification of the equitable doctrine of laches applied to broadening
¶27

99

Id. at *66–74.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a) (2010) (“If the invention disclosed in an application
has not been and will not be the subject of an application filed in another
country, or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires
publication of applications eighteen months after filing, the application will not
be published,” provided certain formalities are met.).
101
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a), (c). Failure to notify USPTO of subsequent filing
in an international jurisdiction that requires publication will result in
abandonment of the application in the United States.
102
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT APPLICATION
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011).
103
http://www.google.com/patents (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
104
http://www.ip.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
100
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reissues.105 This tradition dates back to Miller v. Brass Co. and
beyond, and clearly reflects the undisturbed intent of the Supreme
Court.106 The government then pointed to counsel’s admissions at
oral argument that Apple’s broadening was directed to a different
embodiment and that the broadening was thus not foreseen as
evidence that Apple’s reliance on Doll, Graff, and the MPEP were
misplaced.107 Allowing the Staats claims would not break from
precedent as Apple asserts but instead would blaze significant new
ground, because all relevant broadening reissues in Doll and Graff
were directed at all times to the same embodiment, and thus the
public at all times had notice of the nature of the broadening.108
Looking back to the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act,
where §§ 251–252 were added largely in their present form, the
government maintained that the two-year notice window and the
intervening-rights provisions were added for different reasons.109
Consequently, intervening rights cannot be a compelling enough
safeguard to override the superior interests of the public.110 In
closing, the government stated that when read as a whole, the Patent
Act would not permit Apple’s actions—to do so would open the door
for the worst-case scenario of placeholder, submarine-type reissue
patents for which claim scope could be altered throughout the entire
patent term.111
¶28

C. Apple’s Reply Brief
Finally, in its reply brief, Apple essentially reiterated the
points in its opening brief, but noted again that historical allusions to
cases such as Bridgeport Brass were inapposite because that era
preceded a time when there were clear statutory bounds for
¶29

105

Brief of Appellee-Respondent, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
21, 2011), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 327, at *11.
106
Id. at *11–13 (citing Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 355 (1881)).
107
Id. at *12–15.
108
See id. at *17–18.
109
Id. at *50 (citing Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Indus. Crating & Packing Inc., 756
F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Federico’s Commentary on the New Patent
Act set aside the intervening rights of § 252 as a personal defense to patent
infringement for particular users who began use before the reissue was granted;
§ 251 rights are for the public at large.
110
Id. at *50–51.
111
Id. at *61–63.
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broadening reissues.112 The policy arguments of the government
simply did not justify an extra-statutory limitation.113 Apple also
appealed to judicial efficiency, stating that the new USPTO rule
arising from Staats would create a “new, confusing, and endlessly
litigable ground for challenging reissue patents in district court.”114
Courts would be forced to navigate what even the USPTO admitted
was a “fact-intensive inquiry” into relatedness between a patent and
subsequent reissue patent applications.115
D. Oral Argument
The compelling arguments and skilled briefing by both parties
set the stage for oral argument on September 8, 2011. The panel,
comprised of Judges Dyk, O’Malley, and Reyna,116 quickly asked
questions focusing on an interpretation of USPTO rules and prior
court precedent. After Apple’s counsel John M. Whealan opened by
stating that the proposed USPTO rule would go against the court’s
prior holdings in Doll, Fotland, and Graff, Judge Dyk immediately
asked, “Were those cases correctly decided?”117 Whealan responded
in the affirmative.118 Judge Dyk later asked USPTO Associate
Solicitor William Lamarca a similar question: “Doesn’t your
argument lead you to say that Doll was wrongly decided?”119 When
Lamarca demurred, stating, “Doll is precedent . . . . [W]e understand
that,”120 Judge Dyk asked again, “Do you believe Doll was correctly
decided?”121 Lamarca responded, “I personally think Doll could have
been decided more strictly . . . . [T]he PTO understands that it’s
precedent . . . . [I]f it was 1971 right now and we were arguing about
the Doll situation, I, as a PTO representative, would have argued
¶30

112

Reply Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 403, at *17–20.
113
Id. at *35–40.
114
Id. at *39–40.
115
Id. at *38.
116
Senior Judge Clevenger was on the panel for all other cases heard on
September 8, 2011, but apparently recused himself for the Staats hearing.
117
Oral Argument at 1:46, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argumentrecordings/search/audio.html (search for “2010-1443” in the field “Appeal
Number”).
118
Id. at 1:48.
119
Id. at 20:26.
120
Id. at 20:32.
121
Id. at 20:39.
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against it being decided that way. But the PTO lost that argument.
We lost. And we accept that.”122 Judge Dyk’s persistent interest in
whether the C.C.P.A. wrongly decided Doll seems to suggest that
Doll is critically relevant in this case and the resolution of this case
might include some reevaluation of Doll’s precedential value.
The early Supreme Court decisions relating to broadening
reissue applications, including Miller v. Brass Co.,123 Sontag Chain
Stores Co., Ltd. v. National Nut Co. of California,124 and Webster
Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co.,125 were also pertinent to the
discussion. One of the most heated exchanges of the argument arose
in response to a question posed by Judge Dyk to Apple counsel John
M. Whealan. In reference to the older precedent, Judge Dyk asked
whether Apple’s proposed rule would hypothetically be permissible
under those cases, and if it would have constituted laches.126 For the
next several minutes, Judge Dyk and Mr. Whealan sparred over the
answer, with Whealan refusing to concede that the posed hypothetical
was even valid, and Judge Dyk becoming increasingly frustrated.
Judge Dyk finally concluded, “You can’t answer my question,”127
and “you’re agreeing that under the Miller Brass regime this would
not have been permissible.”128
¶31

Judge Dyk also sparred with Lamarca on the old cases,
stating: “I find it very difficult to find in those earlier Supreme Court
cases any support whatsoever for the distinction the Board made
¶32

122

Id. at 20:42.
104 U.S. 350 (1881).
124
310 U.S. 281 (1940).
125
264 U.S. 463 (1924). Webster Elec. Co. was the chief foundation of the
“laches” reasoning in the Board decision. See Ex parte Staats, No. 2009007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *13–14. In Webster, the Supreme Court held
that a patentee applying for a broadening reissue eight years after the initial
patent had issued had resulted in “a case of unreasonable delay and neglect on
the part of the applicant and his assignee in bringing forward claims broader
than those originally sought.” Webster, 264 U.S. at 465–66.
126
Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 12:03.
127
Id. at 13:47.
128
Id. at 14:08. This exchange would not be the last time Judge Dyk and Mr.
Whealan would be at loggerheads in the course of the oral argument. During
rebuttal, when Whealan was discussing how the advent of intervening rights has
made more liberal broadening reissue practice possible, Judge Dyk countered,
“But those intervening rights are pretty limited.” Id. at 32:07. Whealan
immediately interrupted, “That’s not true, Your Honor!” and Judge Dyk
responded, “Don’t interrupt me.” Id. at 32:13.
123
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here.”129 Lamarca responded that the early cases supported the
simple proposition that reissue was available only when a true “error”
was found and that the cases would support the premise that Apple’s
rule would “operate most unjustly against the public.”130 Judge
Dyk’s statements that the Supreme Court cases would seem to
support a position that Doll was wrongly decided, but not support the
Board’s decision, are intriguing.131 Could the panel rule in favor of
Apple on this set of facts and still overturn Doll? While such an
outcome appears unlikely based on the prior opinions and the briefs,
oral argument appears to at least crack the door open to such a
possibility.
The CAFC also appeared to struggle to define a rule to apply
to broadening reissues going forward. Apple’s counsel noted that the
USPTO’s legal argument had shifted throughout the course of the
appeal process:132 the examiner was concerned with the reissue
declaration, the Board was concerned with embodiments, and the
briefs insisted that the test was “unforeseeable.” Thus, the test was
totally “unworkable” and could never be pinned down.133 The
judges, particularly Judge O’Malley, seemed to seize on this point.
Judge O’Malley criticized the USPTO’s argument in several
instances, stating, “Your test is a bit of a moving target,”134 “I still
can’t understand what your test is, other than ‘I know it when I see
it.’ What is your test?”135 and “You’ve sort of avoided using words
like ‘unforeseeable’ here . . . and yet you used them in your brief . . .
are you moving away from that test?”136 Lamarca responded that the
examination was consistent because the embodiments at issue were
“totally unrelated” to the subject matter in the original declaration and
reissue application.137 But Judge O’Malley, sounding somewhat
exasperated, asked, “How is something totally unrelated to a subject
matter if it comes out of the same specification?”138 Lamarca merely
¶33
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Id. at 21:38 (referring to a “foreseeable” error correction reserved within the
statutory time period versus any error).
130
Id. at 22:28.
131
Id. at 21:30.
132
Id. at 9:07.
133
Id. at 9:25.
134
Id. at 16:57.
135
Id. at 18:38.
136
Id. at 24:13.
137
Id. at 24:34.
138
Id. at 24:42.
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responded that he did not feel the statute could be read in this manner,
suggesting that he understood the importance (and potential
weakness) of defining terms like “unforeseeable” and “unrelated.”
Two other exchanges from the USPTO’s argument are worth
highlighting. At the end of the respondent’s argument, Judge Reyna
asked Lamarca a question about the effects of broadening reissue
applications on innovation: “It seems to me though that [broadening
reissue practice] advances innovation, and that encourages . . .
creativity by the inventors. If we were to adopt the PTO’s
determination, what would that do to innovation within the American
patent system?”139 Mr. Lamarca responded that the “opposite” would
be true: adopting Apple’s determination would take away public
notice, and “blurring” the lines of the patent would discourage
innovation.140 Given Apple’s history of innovation in the
consumer-electronics field, it would have been interesting to hear
Apple’s answer had it been presented with a similar question.
Second, in response to a question by Judge O’Malley, Mr. Lamarca
stated, “[Y]ou can’t take back what you’ve already given to the
public . . .” with regard to clearly demarcating the lines of the patent
property right.141 Although in a different intellectual property
context, this position is an intriguing one for the government given
the 2011 Fall Term Supreme Court case Golan v. Holder.142
¶34

Although the points raised at oral argument generally
followed those presented in the briefs, some interesting insights
emerged as the argument proceeded. Apple maintained stare decisis
principles dictated that the forty years of practice since Doll should
¶35
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Id. at 28:09 (responding to Mr. Lamarca’s contention that if Apple’s
determination were upheld, “tomorrow” a deluge of inventors would go to the
PTO and file broadening reissue applications).
140
Id. at 28:25.
141
Id. at 23:25.
142
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (No.
10-545), argued, Oral Argument, Golan v. Holder (No. 10-545) (Oct. 5, 2011),
available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argu
ment=10-545. In Golan, various interested parties are challenging the
constitutionality of section 104A of the Copyright Act, which was added by way
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. The provision restores copyright to a
subset of foreign works that had previously been in the public domain; thus, it is
interesting to hear a government attorney argue here that the public can never
lose what intellectual property rights holders had given them.
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support its arguments, while the USPTO claimed again that Apple’s
proposed practice was unsupportable under the statutes and rules, and
denied proper notice to the public. While the overall tenor of the oral
argument was cordial, there certainly were tense, heated moments,
mostly between Judge Dyk and Apple’s counsel Whealan. Judge
O’Malley seemed to be the more aggressive interrogator of the
USPTO’s Lamarca, and Judge Reyna may be the critical vote on this
panel. In addition, Judge Dyk’s question “How often does this
problem come up?”143 suggests that the panel may wrestle with the
question of just how broad or narrow real-world applications of any
prospective holding might be. The court may choose to rule narrowly
simply on the set of facts in Staats, or it may take the opportunity to
make a more sweeping pronouncement on the boundaries of
broadening reissue practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
“In . . . reissues more deviltry, if I may be permitted to use the phrase,
creeps into the practice of patent law than everything else put
together. Reissues ought to be guarded carefully . . . .”144

In many ways, broadening reissue practice is a headache for
patent attorneys today, just as it was in the 1870s. Considering the
remarkable body of case law and commentary addressing the concept
of broadening reissues and attempts to alter its implementation and
practice, we have come full circle since the earliest efforts to rein in
the potential for—and actual abuse of—reissue patent practice. The
issue now before the CAFC is distilled down to a question of how
long is too long to give adequate public notice in broadening reissue
applications. And what must that “notice” entail? How much notice
must be given when reissue applicants seek to pursue broader reissue
patent claims directed to embodiments that may differ from those
sought initially? In addition to the two-year statutory window for
broadening reissues, and the “foreseeability” aspect applied in Staats
and earlier cases, the authors believe that a reasonable balance must
be achieved between providing adequate public notice in broadening
reissue patent applications, while still providing enforceable rights for
patent owners.
¶36
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Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 26:20.
ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS OF THE S. AND H.R., S. MISC.
DOC. NO. 45-50, at 104–05 (2d Sess. 1878) (statement of M.D. Leggett, exCommissioner of Patents); see also Federico, supra note 10, at 610.
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There is a need to rein in any unbounded145 “shifting” of
subject matter claimed in chains of continuation broadening reissue
applications filed years after the initial two-year statutory window for
filing a broadening reissue application. The CAFC should create a
mechanism for the USPTO to implement that would limit excessive
alteration of patent claim scope by reissue and the use of such
applications solely as a means to capture previously unforeseen
competitors and their equally unforeseen products.
¶37

The limiting mechanism must be calibrated to permit
appropriate alterations of claim scope in reissue applications, and
even in continuing broadening reissue applications, which can be
beneficial to inventors and provide the necessary means to correct
later-discovered mistakes in a patent.146 In such legitimate
circumstances, continuing broadening reissue applications should be
permitted outside the two-year statutory window if unequivocal intent
to broaden is demonstrated in an initial broadening reissue
application. The devil is in the details, however, because it will be
difficult to define reasonable bounds of permissibility (in time and in
scope) for continuing broadening reissue applications. For example,
what is an “unequivocal” intent to broaden, and how long is too long
to permit broadening of any kind, especially in the context of
continuations of broadening reissue applications?
¶38

One possible solution, though perhaps difficult to implement
in practice, would be to require inventors to scour their patent and
provide multiple examples of errors (assuming there are multiple
errors) in the declaration accompanying an initial broadening reissue
application. That is, inventors would explain in their declaration any
number of possible “errors” and specify possible avenues for
claiming subject matter not earlier claimed due to mistake, as well as
a detailed explanation of why such errors do not constitute
impermissible recapture of surrendered subject matter. Then, the
inventors would be limited to pursuing families of broadening reissue
applications (including continuations thereof) with claims limited to
only those errors initially identified. This declaration could serve a
¶39
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Unbounded in terms of scope, while still clearly bounded by the term of the
parent patent.
146
See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892) (“Under such circumstances,
it would be manifestly unjust to deny him the benefit of a reissue to secure to
him his actual invention, provided it is evident that there has been a mistake and
he has been guilty of no want of reasonable diligence in discovering it . . . .”).
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public-notice function, by apprising the public of the possible scope
of reissue applications stemming from a given patent vis-à-vis the
declaration accompanying an initial broadening reissue application.
The counterpoint to this proposal, of course, is that it may be difficult
or impossible to recognize all possible errors at the time of filing an
initial broadening reissue application, and that additional errors
sometimes may not come to light until inventors are deeply involved
in prosecution of the initial broadening reissue application.
Moreover, how should one define “unrelated” or
“unforeseeable” embodiments? And how would these definitions
affect patent owners’ rights? For example, in today’s white-hot
“smartphone” market, product development is so rapid and the
product lifecycle is so short (a fraction of the length of a patent term)
that it may be impossible to predict all possible future variations that
competitors might attempt to exploit in designing around a patent.
¶40

To take just one simple example: assume an inventor
discloses a novel portable electronic device and has patent claims
directed to its screen and user interface. The inventor has a robust
disclosure of the device, its screen, its functionality, user interface,
display, battery, software, etc. Along comes a competitor (within two
years of patent grant) who intends to market a similar yet
noninfringing device. Assume the competitor attempts a designaround to change the user interface and provide a remarkably longlasting battery to power a similar device. Should the inventor be
permitted to file a broadening reissue application within two years to
pursue claims directed to the competitor’s user interface (assuming
support from the patent disclosure and no attempt at recapture)?
Probably yes. Now, assume the original inventor’s disclosure
broadly describes the battery used in the claimed device, but the
inventor never included any claims directed to the battery in either
the patent or an initial broadening reissue application. Should the
inventor be permitted to file a continuation of that broadening reissue
application after two years to add claims to a battery for a portable
electronic device? This question is more complicated. Would claims
to a battery have been “foreseeable” to a competitor having
knowledge of the original patent and its disclosure? Perhaps. Would
claims to a battery be considered “unrelated” to the original device
and user interface claims for the portable electronic device? Possibly.
One can readily see that this is a gray area defying simple
categorization.
¶41
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There must be a balancing to promote competition while still
protecting patent owners’ rights, in order to allow patent owners to
maintain the value of their patent by later claiming more broadly that
which they were originally entitled to claim. Overall patent value
may otherwise decrease if the potential scope of broadening reissues
is curtailed. For example, in the smartphone market, patent value
could diminish significantly after a short time, especially if a patent
owner is not permitted to mine (within reason) a robust patent
disclosure for unclaimed subject matter.
¶42

So where should we place the fulcrum in this balance? One
possibility is for the CAFC to judicially implement a hard time limit
on filing continuations of broadening reissue applications. For
example, there could be a time limit requiring the filing of any
continuing broadening reissue applications within three years after
the initial two-year window for the first broadening reissue
application. Thus, all broadening reissue patent applications
(including any continuations) would have to be filed within five years
of the initial patent grant, with expiration of any reissue patents still
tied to the original patent’s term. Five years is a long time in the
smartphone market. For example, just after the iPhone® 4S release,
one will notice that there are not many people carrying the original
iPhone® from 2007. That being said, however, there are likely many
patented features in the original iPhone® that are still aggressively
being litigated today.
¶43

The problem for the CAFC, if it attempts to establish a brightline rule for capping continuing broadening reissue applications, is
that it is difficult to objectively and even-handedly apply such a rule
to patents overall and across so many industries and technologies.147
¶44

147

For example, patents in the biopharmaceutical industry are particularly
valuable towards the end of their term as they recoup time lost due to FDA
approval and fend off generic competitors, whereas in industries such as
semiconductors, patents may more quickly become obsolete before the end of
their term. See Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Study of the Twenty Year Patent
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 377 n.32 (1994) (“There is some evidence, however,
that the value of patents over time may differ by industry. For example, because
of regulatory delays, patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
may be more valuable at the end of their term than at the beginning.”); see also
Robert L. Risberg, Jr., Comment, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation
Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act; Unmasking the Spectre of Chip
Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process Technologies, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 241, 252 (1990) (“In addition, some companies neglect to patent facets
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Sometimes, however, courts seem to favor bright-line rules. Other
times, they prefer overly complicated or case-specific approaches
with many corollaries that soon muddy even their most
straightforward application.
Broadening reissue practice may remain a headache for patent
attorneys regardless of the outcome in Staats. We must hope that the
CAFC uses the occasion of the Staats case to impart a reasonable and
fair balance between adequate public notice and enforceable rights
for patent owners in broadening reissue patent applications.
¶45

of a chip that are eligible because the chip may be obsolete by the time the
Patent and Trademark Office issues a patent.”).

